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IN THE SUPREME COU.RT 
of the 
STATE OF ~tTA~ L E. 0 
' - j\jll 4: t964 
GLENNARD M:. H~L.LINS, __ .---------------~ c~-~;t;··ut~·h·--
Pla~nhff and Appelta"#jp , Suprern 
vs 
THE R E L IAN C E INSURANCE. 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDE·NT'S BRIEF 
Gase No. 
10168 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third District Court 
for Salt Lake County 
Honorable Aldon J. Anderson, Jr., Judge 
CHRISTENSEN AND JENSE.N 
1205 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
MARK & SCHOENHALS 
903 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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IN THE SUPREME COU.RT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
OLI~~~X .\HI> ~L HOLLINS, 
Plaintiff aud Appellant, 
VS 
THE H 11~ L 1 AN C E INSURANCE 
CO~IP..:\NY~ a corporation, 
DcfcJI(la nt and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10168 
STATI£,MENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This purports to be an action in defamation against 
The Reliance Insurance Company, which had brought an 
action against its indemnitor (Hollins, plaintiff below), 
to recover losses sustained by it (The Reliance Insurance 
Company), a~ a result of writing an automobile dealer's 
bond in cmnpliance with the Utah Motor ·vehicle Dealer's 
Aet. 
DISPOSITIOX IX LOWER COURT 
On n10tion of defendant and respondent the com-
plaint was disn1issed for failure to state a claim upon 
which reli~:.•f could be granted. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant and respondent seeks an affinnance of 
the judgment below. 
THE FACTS 
This case is a companion to the case of The Reliance 
Insurance Company vs. Glennard M. Hollins) No. 10087, 
and grows out of the earlier case. However, the two 
eases have not been consolidated on appeal, and The 
Reliance Insurance Company (hereinafter called Reli-
ance), is represented by separate counsel in each case. 
The only facts· before the court in the instant case are 
those contained in the plaintiff's complaint, which is 
quite lengthy, and with its various attachments, runs to 
21 pages. (R. 1-21). The essential facts, as set forth in 
the plaintiff's complaint, in chronological order, are as 
follows: 
1. On the 14th day of June, 1964, plaintiff Hollins, 
on behalf of Hollins, Inc., made application for a Motor 
Vehicle Dealer's Bond as required by the Motor Vehicle 
Dealer's Act of the State of Utah. (R. 1, 19). The appli-
cation signed by Hollins contained the following lan-
guage: 
"The undersigned further agrees to reim-
burse and save harmless and indemnify the Com-
pany for, from, and against ariy and all loss, 
damage or expense that it shall or may at any 
time sustain, incur, or become liable for by rea-
son of or on account of its having executed the 
said bond or any extension, amendment, or re-
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nPwal of ~aid bond, or a new bond as a contin-
uation therPof or a substitute therefor or in 
<'on.iunction then'with: also for, fr01n, and against 
any and all costs and expenses that may be in-
('UI'l'Pd h)' the Company in investigating any 
elaiin n1ade thereunder, or in or about prosecuting 
or defending- any action, suit, or other proceed-
ing~ that ma)' be commenced or prosecuted by or 
against the undersigned, his or their heirs, exe-
entor~, administrators, successors, or assigns, or 
againt the Company, upon the said bond or other-
wise in relation thereto." (R. 19) 
:2. Pursuant to said application a bond was issued 
hy defPndant July 6, 1954. (R. 1). Thereafter, the 
GP1wral Credit Company filed an action against The 
HdianeP Insurance Con1pany on the aforesaid bond, 
(·laiming violations by the principal on the bond (Hollins, 
Inc.), of the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Dealer's 
Art, and in particular, of failure on the part of the prin-
eipal to deliver title certificates to two separate pur-
eha~wrs of aut01nobiles. (R. 2). The file before this court 
does not contain the c01nplaint or other pleadings in the 
Ut>neral Credit ease. However, the judgment in that 
ease (in favor of Reliance) is attached to the complaint 
as an exhibit. (R. 11). The trial court specifically found 
in that case that both of the sale transactions were made 
by defendant's principal with full knowledge of the 
General Credit Company; that General Credit C01npany 
held in its possession the certificates of title to the auto-
mobiles and refused to deliver them to the purchasers, 
although it had knowledge of, and had approved of the 
proposed sales. (R. 12-13). The court further specifically 
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found, "That as to the plaintiff, [The General Credit 
Company] Glen Hollins, Inc., did not violate the provi-
sions of Sec. 41-1-65, U.C.A. 1953, and as to the plaintiff 
did not violate the provisions of Sec. 41-3-23 (d), U.C.A. 
1953. (Emphasis Ours). (R. 13). The court also found 
that defendant's principal had not delivered title certifi-
cates to the purchasers. (R. 13). 
3. Thereafter, Reliance c o m m e n c e d an action 
against Hollins, its indemnitor, to recover damages 
which it had sustained in settling claims of the pur-
chasers hereinbefore mentioned, (who were not parties 
to the earlier action) and in defending the action com-
menced by The General Credit Company. (R. 14, et seq.). 
The allegations of the complaint in that case are entirely 
consistent with the findings of the court in the General 
Credit Company case. In the case of Reliance vs. Hollins, 
it was alleged in the complaint that Hollins was unable 
to deliver title to the purchasers, and that by reason 
thereof, Reliance became obliged to pay damages to the 
purchasers of the automobiles, and incurred attorneys' 
fees in defending said claims. While the complaint in 
that case may have been technically defective in alleging 
that Hollins individually could not make delivery rather 
than that the corporation, Hollins, Inc., could not make 
delivery, this was a technical defect only. Clearly Re-
liance was proceeding against Hollins on his indemnity 
agreement above mentioned. Even though he was indi-
vidually free of fault or breach of statutory duty, he was 
contractually obligated to Reliance to hold it harmless. 
(R. 14-15). 
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4. 11 lw adion broug·ht by Reliance agai-nst Hollins 
was diHmiss('d for reasons which do not clearly appear in 
thP J'('('OI'd. rrhe judgment Of dismissal does not set 
forth an~' rpa::-;on for the court's ruling, but merely re-
<·itP~ that thP matter was argued to the court and that 
the court was fully advised in the premises. (R. 21). 
rl. Following dismissal of the case brought by Reli-
ance againHt Hollins, and after it had initiated appeal 
prm·<·Pdings, Hollins cmn1nenced this action against Re-
limH'P apparently on the theory of defamation. (R. 1, et 
~Pq.) TlwrP are many allegations in the complaint, the 
offieP of which we do not understand. For example there 
are many allegations suggesting that the attorneys who 
rPpre~Pnted Reliance Insurance Company in the General 
Credit Company case were also acting as personal attor-
IH.>ys for Hollins. There is at least some inference or 
innuendo of breach of ethical conduct on their part. Hmv-
ever, Hollins was not a party to the original action 
brought by General Credit Company. He did, however, 
cooperate with Reliance in the successful defense of that 
aetion. It was very 1nuch to his advantage to do ,so, 
since he would have been personally liable for any lo,ss 
sustained by Reliance. However, the fact th~t. ;he, co-
operated with the attorneys defending. Reliance . in . that 
action did not create a relationship of ~ttorney and 9lient 
between the attorneys and himself. On. the cont.rary, he 
well knew that said attorneys were engaged by Reliance, 
and were representing its interests. 
6. Reliance attacked plaintiff's complaint by vari-
ous n10tions, including a motion to dismiss for failure to 
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state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (R. 24-
30). After oral argument, the motion to dismiss was 
granted, and plaintiff's case was dismissed. (R. 32). 
This appeal followed. (R. 31). 
_ Based upon statements of counsel for the appellant 
in argument on the motion to dismiss in the lower court, 
and upon the argument set forth in his brief before this 
court, it appears that he considers this to he a case of 
defamation, and we therefore address our argument to 
that theory. 
ARGUME·NT 
It may be noted at the outset that plaintiff's claim is 
based entirely upon the ruling of the court below in the 
case of Reliance Insurance Company vs. Hollins. If this 
court reverses that judgment, as we believe that it 
should, it necessarily follows that the judgment in the 
present action should be affirmed. However, even if it 
is determined that the appeal in Case No. 10087 is with-
out merit, we believe that the judgment below in the 
instant case must be affirmed. 
As we have pointed out in our Statement of Facts, 
the allegations of the complaint in the case of Reliance 
Insurance Company vs. Hollins are really not defama-
tory, even if they were not privileged. In that case the 
plaintiff merely alleged a failure on the part of Hollins 
to deliver ti•tle certificates to purchasers of automobiles 
from Hollins, Inc. This is no more demafatory than an 
allegation in a personal injury suit that defendant vio-
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latP<l a ~tat utP or ordinanrP for the control of autmnobile 
l raffi<'. Tht~ eomplaint is at worst, only technically de--
I'PdivP, in all(•ging that the failure was that of Hollins 
IH'r~onnll~- ratlwr than his corporation. There is_ no ques-
tiPn, hoW\'YPr, that the title certificates were not de-
livPrt~d, and RelianeP, in good faith, claimed a loss by 
rt·a~on of the execution of its bond as a result thereof. 
JlowPn'r, even if the 1nistaken identification of Hollins 
individually, as the party who precipitated t~e loss, 
eould be ternwd dc'fan1atory under other circumstances, 
n~ an allegation in the complaint it was absolutely 
priviiPg\'d. The general rule of privilege as it pertains 
to litigant~, is sd forth in Restatement of Torts, Sec. 
:lSI. as follows: 
".J [Htrty to a private litigation or a private 
prosecutor or defendant in a criminal prosecution 
is absol~ttely priviliged to publish false and de-
frunatory 1natter of another in communications 
preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or 
in the institution of or during the course and as a 
part of a judicial proceeding in which he partici-
pates, if the matter has smne relation thereto." 
(E1nphasis Ours.) 
In Com1nent a thereunder, the rule is further ex-
pounded as follows: 
.. The privilege stated in this Section is based 
upon the public interest in according to all men 
the utmost freedmn of access to the courts of jus-
tice for the settlement of their private disputes. 
Like the privilege of an attorney, it is a.bsotute. 
It protects a party to a private litigation or a 
private prosecutor in a criminal prosecution from 
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liability for defmnation irrespective of his pur-
pose in publishing the defamatory matter, of his 
belief in its truth or even his knowledge of its 
falsity. * * *" (Emphasis Ours.) 
And in Comment b thereunder, the reporter states 
as follows: 
"·The rule stated in this Section is applicable 
to protect parties to any action before a judicial 
tribunal. It is immaterial whether the action is 
criminal or civil in character." 
See also Comment d: 
"The rule stated in this Section affords to a 
party to litigation the same protection from lia-
bility for defamatory statements ma,de in his 
pleadings as that accorded to an attorney under 
the rule stated in ~ 586." (Emphasis Ours.) 
The rule is the same with regard to attorneys. S.ee 
Restatement of Torts, Sec. 586, and Comment a there-
under: 
"An attorney at law is absolurtetly privileged 
to publish false and defamatory matter of another 
in communications prelin1inary to a proposed 
judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or 
during the course and as a part of a judicial pro-
ceeding in which he participates as counsel, if it 
has some relation thereto. 
"a. ·The privilege stated in this section is 
based upon a public policy of securing to attor· 
neys as officers of the court the utmost freedom 
in their efforts to secure justice for their clients. 
Therefore the privilege is absolute. It protects 
the attorney from liability in an action for defa-
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Illation irn·:-;pPdivP of his purpose in publishing 
the dPfanwtor~· matter, his belief in its truth or 
1'\'!'ll his knowledgP of its falsity. * * * The in-
stitution of a judicial proceeding includes all 
Jdi'(Ul i llffs and affidavits necessary to set the 
jndi<·ia I nmchinery in Inotion." (E1nphasis 01~rs.) 
To thP :-;anH:' eff!•d see P ro0.scr on Torts, 2d Ed. Sec. 
HG pap;P (itHi, et seq. : 
"The defendant may be privileged to publish 
defamation for the protection or furtherance of 
a public or private interest recognized by the law 
as entitled to such protection. Privileged utter-
ances fall into two classes: 
"a. Those absolutely immune from responsi-
bility, without regard to the defendant's purpose 
or motive, or the reasonableness of his conduct. 
These include: 
" ( 1) Judicial proceedings. 
* * * 
''Absolute i1nmunity has been confined to a 
vpn· few situations where there is an obvious 
poliey in favor of permitting compl~te freedom 
of expression, without any inquiry_ as to the de-
fendant's nwtives. By gener::tl agreement, it is 
lilnited to the following situations: 
··1. Judicial Proceedings. The judge on the 
bench 1nust be free to administer the law under 
the protection of the law; independently and free-
ly, without fear of consequences. No such inde-
pendence could exist if he were in d a i l y 
apprehension of having an action brought against 
hi1n, and his administration of justice submitted 
to the opinion of a jury. 
* . * • 
·•For the smne reason, a similar absolute im-
Inunity is conferred upon grand and petit jurors 
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in the performance of their functions, upon wit-
nesses, whether they testify voluntarily or not, 
and upon counsel in the conduct of the case. Like-
wise, since there is an obvious public interest in 
affording to everyone the utmost freedom of 
access to the courts, the imm,unity extends to the 
parties to private litigation, as well as to defend-
ants and instigators of prosection in criminal 
cases, as to anything that may be said in relation 
to the matter at issue, whether it be in the plead-
ings, in affidavits, or in open court." (Emphasis 
ours.) 
See also 1 Harper & James on the Law of Torts, 
Sec. 5.22: 
" 'Neither party, witness, counsel, jury or 
judge,' said Lord 11ansfield, 'can be put to answer 
civilly or criminally for words spoken in offices.'" 
(Emphasis ours.) 
And further : 
"Counsel, of course, are also protected by 
the absolute privilege. Attorneys are officers of 
the court, and as such, have an obligation to 
society as well as to their clients. It is essential 
that they be free to act on their best judgment, 
without fear of answering in a civil action for de-
famation for anything said in the course of 
judicial proceedings in which they participate. 
The protection extends to· statements ma.de in 
pleadings, affidavits or in open court." (Emphasis 
ours.) 
To the same effect also see 33 Ani. Jur., Libel and 
Slander, 1964 Cumulative Suppleinent, page 22: 
"The doctrine of absolute privilege is based 
upon the principle of good public policy, in that 
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thP int('l'P~t~ and necessities of society require 
that on <'Prtain occasion utterances or publica-
tion~ of individuals, even though they are both 
t'al~(' and malieiously made, shall protect the de-
l'a tliPI' frmn all liability to prosection. * * *" 
;\ good judicial discussion is found in Johnson vs . 
• ~·l'hlar/J, (\Vasl1.), 110 P.2d 190, where the c·ourt said: 
"In detPrmining whether or not matter spoken 
in thP conduct of an action or contained in the 
pleadings is privileged, the test is not - is it 
legally relevant~ But - Does it have. reference 
and relation to the subject matter .of the action~ 
\Ve quote from S.acks v. Stecker, 60 F.2d 73, 75, 
decided by the Federal Second Circuit Court of 
.\ ppeals in 19·32: 'By an almost unbroken. line· of 
authority in this country and Engfand, a party 
lf'ho files a pleading or affidavit in a judicial pro-
ceeding has absolute immunity, though his state-
ments are defamatory. and malicious, if they 
relate to the subject of inquiry. *. * *" (Emphasis 
ours.) 
The court then went on to quote the Mansfield quota-
tion which we have quoted from Harper.& James, an:d 
the Ht>statmnent rules above quoted. 
The foregoing rules have been codified in this state, 
and haYl' received judicial recognition by ths court. Sec. 
-1-5-:2-3, U. C.~-\. 1953, provides, insofar _as 1naterial hen~, 
a:3 follows: 
•· 'A privileged publication which shall not be 
considered as libelous per se, is one made : 
* * * 
.. (2) In any publication of or any statement 
1nade in any legislative or judicial proceeding, or 
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in any other official proceeding authorized by 
law." 
In the recent case of Carter v. Jackson, 10 Ut. 2d, 
284, 351 P.2d 957, this court said: 
"There are two classes of privileged com-
munications, absolute and qualified or condi-
tional. In the case of absolutely privileged 
communications the utterance or publication, al-
though both false and malicious, does not give 
rise to a cause of action. * * * 
, "Subsections (1) and (2) of 45-2-3, U.C.A. 
1953, define the communications that are abso-
lutely privileged. * * *" (Emphasis ours.) 
See also the earlier case of Williams vs. Standard 
Examiner Pub. Co., et al., 83 Utah 31, 27 P.2d 1, where 
this court said : 
"In the case of absolutely privileged com-
munications the utterances or publication, al-
though both false and malicious, does not give 
rise to a cause of action." 
CONCLUSION 
The allegations of the complaint in The Reliance In-
surance Company v. Hollins, are not defamatory and 
therefore are not actionable. Even if said allegations 
were otherwise defamatory they are absolutely privi-
leged under both the statute and decisional law of this 
state. The judgment of dismissal should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CHRISTENSEN .AND JENSEN 
By R.A Y R. CHRIS'TENSEN 
1205 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respondent 
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